Transforming ASN.1 Specifications into CafeOBJ to assist with Property
  Checking by Barlas, Konstantinos et al.
Transforming ASN.1 Specifications into CafeOBJ to assist 
with Property Checking
Konstantinos Barlas 
School of Electrical and Computer 
Engineering 
George Koletsos 
School of Electrical and Computer 
Engineering 
Petros Stefaneas 
School of Applied Mathematical and 
Physical Sciences 
National Technical University of Athens 
Polytexneioupoli Zografou, Iroon Politexneiou 9, 15780, Athens, Greece
+306977359857 
kosbarl@central.ntua.gr 
+302107721773 
koletsos@math.ntua.gr 
+302107721869 
petros@math.ntua.gr 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The adoption of algebraic specification/formal method techniques 
by the networks‟ research community is happening slowly but 
steadily. We work towards a software environment that can 
translate a protocol's specification, from Abstract Syntax Notation 
One (ASN.1 – a very popular specification language with many 
applications), into the powerful algebraic specification language 
CafeOBJ. The resulting code can be used to check, validate and 
falsify critical properties of systems, at the pre-coding stage of 
development. In this paper, we introduce some key elements of 
ASN.1 and CafeOBJ and sketch some first steps towards the 
implementation of such a tool including a case study. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
D.2.4 [Software Engineering]: Software/Program Verification – 
correctness proofs, formal methods, validation. 
General Terms 
Design, Reliability, Security, Standardization, Languages, 
Verification. 
Keywords 
Specifications, Abstract Syntax Notation One, ASN.1, CafeOBJ, 
formal verification, algebraic specification, correct translation, 
protocol specification, property checking. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Software reliability is a critical aspect of software quality. A way 
to ensure reliability is to make full use of formal specifications. 
Using formal methodologies we can make sure that the resulting 
code is a correct implementation of the specification. Such 
methods can be applied, for example, at the stage before a 
program is being tested in real time, maximizing the chances that 
it will be error-free when it gets released. Telecommunication 
protocol standards have been written in the Abstract Syntax 
Notation One (ASN.1 – a data definition language) format, 
however there‟s little we can do about the verification of 
properties in this format. We have been working towards a 
software environment that can translate a protocol's specification 
that is written in the ASN.1 format, into a fully executable set of 
CafeOBJ [Diaconescu and Futatsugi 1998] specifications. The 
resulting code can then be used to verify critical properties of the 
designed system via the powerful CafeOBJ proving engine. There 
have been some related works, such as the work of Senachak, et 
al. [2005] which combines the specification language CafeOBJ 
with Java. Another similar approach can be found in the work of 
Martin and Thomas [1994]. The authors have investigated the 
verification requirements of LOTOS specifications and 
determined the applicability of equational reasoning and term 
rewriting to discharging these requirements. They also developed 
a tool for ASN.1 to LOTOS translation. 
Our approach is different from the above work, since it aims more 
towards system verification and/or falsification, hoping that it can 
be used as a great asset to protocol developers; we can take 
advantage of code already written in ASN.1 and by properly 
translating it into CafeOBJ, we can use the proof engine for 
property checking. 
A approach to ours can be found in the work of Shanbhag et al. 
[2001]. It integrates ASN.1 and model checking by creating an 
enhanced version of ASN.1 (EASN). EASN is created by 
replacing SPIN‟s model checking tool datatyping abilities with 
ASN.1 data types. This paper is an improvement of previous 
versions, as seen in the works of Barlas et al. [2009] and Barlas et 
al. [2010]. 
2. ASN.1 
2.1. Introduction to ASN.1 
ASN.1 is a joint ISO/IEC and ITU-T standard and is a well-
known notation used in describing messages to be exchanged 
between communicating application programs [Dubuisson 2001; 
Larmouth 2001]. It is a framework for representing tree structured 
data, providing a set of formal rules for describing the structure of 
objects that are independent of machine-specific encoding 
techniques (freeing protocol designers from having to focus on the 
bits and bytes layout of messages) and is a precise, formal 
notation that removes ambiguities. 
An ASN.1 specification does not specify by itself the concrete 
representation of the data in transmission or storage. The concrete 
representation is stated as the transfer syntax in ASN.1 terms and 
is determined by the application of one of a set of encoding rules. 
  
  
 
 
 
An obvious advantage of ASN.1 is that the same data 
(semantically) can be formatted in other various other ways 
(syntactically) by applying different encoding rules. For example, 
a very compact binary representation uses PER [Dubuisson 2001]. 
Currently the only "transfer syntax" for XML Schema or RELAX 
NG is XML. 
ASN.1 has been initially used to describe email messages within 
the Open Systems Interconnection protocols, and since then has 
been adopted for use by a wide range of other applications, such 
as in network management, secure email, cellular telephony, air 
traffic control, voice and video over the Internet, security, 
authentication & cryptography, banking, wireless networks, 
transportation, energy, electronic tags and cards, health and 
genetics and graphics and file transfer. 
2.2. ASN.1 Extensions 
ASN.1 is designed for efficiency and the data is usually packed 
into byte boundaries, and hence is not very readable and is not 
very easy to manipulate. Since ASN.1 data is structured data, it is 
possible to represent the same information in Extensible Markup 
Language (XML). XML is not particularly efficient in terms of 
data length, but is more readable, and it has many off-the-shelf 
free tools (e.g., XML processors for parsing and generation, XSL 
processors for rendering, XML editors for authoring, and so on). 
XML can serve as transfer syntax for ASN.1, and the cooperation 
of those two notations can only benefit both of them.  
What makes ASN.1 so important is that there are numerous 
examples of existing, widely deployed, mature applications 
defined in terms of ASN.1, and a whole new XML-keen group 
that is more than happy to use XML (or XML schema language) 
as means of formal specification. 
IBM (among other companies) has developed a two way ASN.1 
to XML translator (ASN.1/XML translator) as part of its XML 
Security Suite, providing a Java library for the translation. Also 
the ASN.1 Project from ITU-T started working (jointly with ISO) 
on two XML-related initiatives.  
Also, ASN.1 conversion to C has been made possible, and lots of 
different tools exist on the market (ASN.1 to C/C++ Compiler, 
ASN.1 to Java/C# Compiler) that generate a full set of a working 
C program generated from a set of ASN.1 specification modules. 
Also, there‟s a cross compiler from ASN.1 to Erlang (Asn1ct) 
which generated encode and decode functions to be used be 
Erlang programs sending and receiving ASN.1 specified data. 
There is also a set of ASN.1 tools for Python, (ASN.1 tools for 
python), which implements ASN.1 data types (concrete syntax) 
and codecs (transfer syntaxes) for Python programming 
environment.  
2.3. Basic Syntax of ASN.1 
Here we will display some basic ASN.1 syntax rules that will 
allow the reader to understand the case study that follows. Below 
is a small excerpt of a larger specification module that describes a 
banking account. The module “Account” will be used to define 
the data exchanged for the central entity of a banking account 
system –the bank account -. We can spot how the ASN.1 
keywords are always spelt in capital letters except some character 
string types such as NumericString). 
 
Account ::= SEQUENCE { 
 iban  NumericString (SIZE (27)), 
 client Client,  
 balance Balance  } 
Figure 1. Example of SEQUENCE 
 
We can read the above as: „an Account is a Sequence of  three 
types: the first called “iban” is used to denote numeric data of a 
fixed length (27 digits); the second component is called “client” 
and denotes data of type “Client” and so on. 
“Account” is an ASN.1 type; notice that it begins with a capital 
letter, it is followed by the “::=” symbol and that its definition 
does not end with a semicolon contrary to many programming 
languages. 
“SEQUENCE” is the most basic and mostly used ASN.1 data 
type, denoting nested data. Alternatives to SEQUENCE are SET, 
SET OF and SEQUENCE OF. Semantically all four types 
represent the same thing, structured data. One similar and equally 
common found data type in ASN.1 specifications is „CHOICE‟.  
Choice only allows one of the nested components to be 
transmitted, and it‟s very useful when a choice has to be made. Its 
syntax is similar to the Sequence data type. 
 
Payment-method ::= CHOICE {   
 check       Check-number,  
 credit-card SEQUENCE { number Card-number,expiry-
date Date}} 
Figure 2. Example of CHOICE 
 
The above examples can be read: 'The Payment-method is a 
choice (CHOICE) between these two components: the first called 
check, denoting data of type Check-number (which of course is 
similarly denoted later); the second called credit-card, denotes a 
sequence of two more components; a component named number 
of type Card-number, and a component called expiry-date of type 
Date.   
Please note that ASN.1 has no knowledge of the data types 
beyond the ones built-in, so we have to write further details for 
the types „Client‟ and „Balance‟.  
 
Client ::= SEQUENCE { 
 clientid Integer, 
 firstname PrintableString (SIZE (1..30)), 
 lastname PrintableString (SIZE (1..50)), 
 street PrintableString (SIZE (1..50)), 
 postcode NumericString (SIZE (5)), 
 city PrintableString (SIZE (1..30)), 
 country PrintableString (SIZE (1..20))  } 
Figure 3. A client's data 
 
This can be read: „A Client, is a structure of seven (we can of 
course add more in the same way) components; The clientid (an 
integer), the first and last name, with a maximum length of 30 and 
50 characters accordingly and finally (denoted in the same 
manner) street, postcode, city and country‟. The Balance module 
is declared accordingly. 
Last but not least, ASN.1, as a specification language, prescribes 
no order when defining the entities. It is actually possible to 
reference the data types before their definition in the specification. 
It is a good idea for readability issues to apply a top-down 
approach to our problem; from general to particular. [Dubuisson 
2000] 
3. CAFEOBJ:  
3.1 An Algebraic Specification Language 
CafeOBJ is a new generation algebraic executable, industrial 
strength algebraic specification language/system. The main 
underlying logics of CafeOBJ are order-sorted algebras 
 
 
 
 
[Diaconescu et al. 1998; Goguen et al. 1992] and hidden algebras 
[Diaconescu et al. 1998; Diaconescu et al. 2000]. The former is 
used to specify abstract data types while the latter to specify 
abstract state machines, providing support for object oriented 
specifications.  
It is a specification and programming language. Since it's a direct 
successor of OBJ, it inherits all its features (flexible mix-fix 
syntax, powerful typing system with sub-types, and sophisticated 
module composition system featuring various kinds of imports, 
parametrised modules, views for instantiating the parameters, 
module expressions, etc.) but it also adds rewriting logic and 
hidden algebra, as well as their combination. 
 
Figure 4. CafeOBJ Cube 
 
Figure 4 displays how CafeOBJ uses institution embeddings 
(represented by arrows) to combine several logics such as many 
sorted algebra, order sorted algebra, hidden algebra and rewriting 
logic. (M for many, O for ordered, H for hidden, S for sorted, A 
for algebra and RWL for rewriting logic.) 
Each CafeOBJ module consists of three main parts: sort 
declaration, operation declaration and axiom declaration. 
There are two kinds of sorts in CafeOBJ, visible sorts representing 
abstract data types, and hidden sorts representing the set of states 
of a state machine. The operations to hidden sorts are classified 
into actions, observations and hidden constants. An action can 
change the state of an abstract machine. It takes a state of the 
abstract machine and zero or more data, and returns another or the 
same state of the abstract machine. An observation is used to 
observe the value of a data component in an abstract machine. It 
takes a state of an object and zero or more data, and returns the 
value of a data component in the abstract machine. Finally, the 
hidden constants denote initial states of abstract machines.  
3.2 Syntax of CafeOBJ 
CafeOBJ notation is presented through the example of a list of 
natural numbers: 
 
mod! NATLIST { 
  pr(NAT) 
  [NatList] 
  op nil : -> NatList 
  op _|_ : Nat NatList -> NatList 
  -- 
  op _@_ : NatList NatList -> NatList 
  op mkl : Nat Nat -> NatList 
  -- 
  vars X Y : Nat 
  vars L1 L2 : NatList 
  -- 
  eq nil @ L2 = L2 . 
  eq (X | L1) @ L2 = X | (L1 @ L2) . 
  -- 
  eq mkl(X,Y) 
     = if Y < X then nil else X | mkl(X + 1,Y) 
fi.} 
Figure 5. A sample CafeOBJ module 
 
The keyword mod! indicates that the module is a tight semantics 
declaration. Visible sorts are declared by enclosing [ and ]. 
NatList is the visible sort of the lists of natural numbers. pr(NAT) 
denotes protecting import of module NAT, that is a built module 
specifying natural numbers. Apart from protecting imports, which 
do not collapse elements or add new elements to the models of the 
imported modules, there exist extending imports, denoted by ex, 
that may add new elements but not collapse elements, and using 
imports, denoted by using keyword, that provide no guaranty, so 
they might even collapse elements. The keyword op or ops is used 
to declare non hidden operators. The operator nil is a constant 
denoting the empty list. The operator _|_ takes a natural number 
and a list and returns the new list, while the operator _@_ denotes 
the concatenation of two lists. Finally, the function mkl(m,n) 
makes the list m | m+1| … | n | nil for two natural numbers m, n. If 
n < m then it returns the empty list.  The lines beginning with the 
keyword -- are comments. Keyword var (vars) declares CafeOBJ 
variables, while the equations defining axioms of the specification 
begin with eq or ceq when the equation is conditional. First and 
second equations defines the concatenation of an empty or non-
empty list with a non-empty list, respectively. The final equation 
defines function mkl. The CafeOBJ system uses declared 
equations as left-to-right rewrite rules and reduces a given term. 
This makes it possible to simulate specified systems and verify 
that they have desired properties. In the case of NATLIST, some 
simulations that we can perform are as follows: 
 
open NATLIST 
  red nil @ nil . 
  red nil @ (0 | 1 | 2 | nil) . 
  red (0 | 1 | 2 | nil) @ (3 | 4 | 5 | nil) . 
  red mkl(0,10) . 
  red mkl(5,5) . 
  red mkl(5,4) . 
close 
Figure 6. Red command in CafeOBJ 
 
The command open makes a temporary module that imports a 
given module and close destroys it. The command red reduces a 
given term. 
3.3 OTS 
Observational Transition System [Ogata et al. 2006] is a transition 
model that defines the behaviour of a system as actions happen 
(changes on observation values after applying a sequence of 
transitions at any state of system). Writing a specification in OTS 
format gives the advantage of specifying a system in an abstract 
way. 
Assuming that „Y‟ is the universal data space (declared by a 
hidden sort) and „D*‟ the data types used in OTSs [Ogata et al. 
2006], an OTS „S‟ is a set of {O,I,T} such that: i) „O‟ is a finite 
set of observers from Y to D* (each operator o є O is a function 
from Y to D) ii) „I‟ is the set of initial states such that I is a subset 
of Y and iii) „T‟ is a finite set of transitions τ from Y to Y 
(transitions are indexed functions that „move‟ the system from one 
state into another).  Each transition τ creates a successor state of Y 
with respect to τ. The condition cτ that is required for a transition 
rule τ є Τ (which is predicate on states) to take place is called the 
  
 
 
 
effective condition. [Senachak et al. 2005] 
4. TRANSLATING ASN.1 
SPECIFICATIONS INTO CAFEOBJ 
Over the past years ASN.1 enjoyed the support of a very 
important consortium and it will continue to be one of the top 
specification languages. On the other hand CafeOBJ, is relatively 
new, slowly emerging as a specification language and mostly as 
means of property checking. 
Our idea aims at helping a designer, who wants to take advantage 
of an already written ASN.1 specification of the designed system, 
in order to check if the system holds some critical properties. 
Without that, the process would be to rewrite a specification from 
scratch into a language that supports proofing methodologies, 
something that could cost lots of time. 
Our suggestion consists of a software environment that takes an 
existing ASN.1 specification and transforms it into a set of 
CafeOBJ modules, giving as a result a foundation we want (a 
basic set of modules representing data) which can be used to 
further test the protocol, checking the validity of critical system 
properties. So in this way, a designer can automatically come up 
with basic CafeOBJ modules, and should only have to deal with 
system checking instead of rewriting and checking. 
4.1. Differences Between the Two 
Environments  
ASN.1 and CafeOBJ are both used for system specifications, but 
in a very different way as they can only be used to specify 
different aspects of the system; ASN.1‟s primary use is to specify 
the static structure of the data that is handled by a system and the 
signatures of the system‟s provided operations. But, it can‟t be 
used to specify any part of a system‟s dynamic behavior since it 
has no means of understanding system states. 
So, we can‟t use ASN.1 to specify how an operation may change 
system‟s data or the actual changes that may occur to data.  
On the other hand, CafeOBJ, can handle both of those cases 
easily, by using „actions‟ that specify the type of changes that can 
happen on a system, and with the use of „observations‟ that return 
data after an action has taken place. CafeOBJ has a different way 
to specify both of these, as its high level of abstraction means that 
the structure of the data is actually implied by the specification (in 
terms of abstract sorts) instead of being explicitly described as in 
ASN.1. This means that any translation from ASN.1 to CafeOBJ 
cannot be 100% complete; the output will only be a part of the 
equivalent CafeOBJ specification, still lots of hard work is already 
done automatically, and now all we would have to do is to 
manually provide some additional information and code rewriting 
to further proceed with the system property checking. 
4.2 The Need for Verified Transformation 
Rules 
To accomplish our goal of transforming the numerous ASN.1 
specifications into CafeOBJ modules, we will need to set some 
ground rules. Rules that at any given time and for any given 
ASN.1 module, can translate the structure from one language to 
another while making sure that no critical data could be either lost 
or misinterpreted. Therefore those transformation rules will have 
to be logically proved, so we can ensure the correctness of the 
engine.  
Rule 1:  An ASN.1 module name serves as a file in CafeOBJ, 
containing all of the modules. 
ASN.1: mName {arguments} DEFINITIONS 
{arguments} := 
  BEGIN 
… 
  END 
CafeOBJ: mName.mod 
 
Rule 2: Each ASN.1 type name serves as a module in CafeOBJ.  
ASN.1: Typename ::= SEQUENCE { 
   ...} 
CafeOBJ: module* TypeName { } 
 
Rule 3a: ASN.1's most used data structures are 'sequences'. Each 
Sequence name (which acts as a place holder for the nested data 
types) is being modeled as a CafeOBJ sort and all of the nested 
types become sub sorts of the main Sort. This way we preserve 
the semantics of the original declarations. 
ASN.1: 
Typename ::= SEQUENCE { 
 subtypename1 sometype), 
 subtypename2 sometype, 
...,  
 subtypenamen sometype } 
CafeOBJ: 
module* TypeName { 
[ Typename > subtypename1 subtypename2 … 
subtypenamen ] } 
This looks a lot like something that could benefit from the use of 
CafeOBJ‟s record type. However, the way records are declared in 
CafeOBJ allow fields (slots) to be optional and we only want this 
to happen when an ASN.1 type has the “OPTIONAL” mark.  
Our approach on the 'choice' data structure, would be similar to 
“Sequence “ translation but on top that we add a few operators 
that only allow one of the viable options to be actually 
transmitted. Something along the lines that only one of the 
available parameters to choose from can actually be non-null, 
otherwise CafeOBJ will not classify the returning state as a 
reachable one. Data types such as SET, SET OF and so on are 
modelled in the exact same way. 
Rule 4: To import an ASN.1 type from a different ASN.1 module 
then in our CafeOBJ file we will declare naturally that type as a 
CafeOBJ module and then every CafeOBJ module in our current 
file (which corresponds to every ASN.1 type in our current 
module) will import that CafeOBJ module. There is also an 
“EXPORTS” clause in ASN.1, dictating us which ASN.1 types of 
the current module can become available to other modules. 
Omission of an “EXPORTS” statement in ASN.1 means that 
“everything is available for import by another module” whilst 
“EXPORTS ;” has the semantics “nothing is available for import 
by another module”. [Larmouth 2001]. We can safely ignore any 
sort of “EXPORTS” clause while translating into CafeOBJ simply 
because it is being implied by a correct use of “IMPORTS” 
clause. 
ASN.1 (while inside mName): 
BEGIN 
IMPORTS type1-1, type1-2, …, type1-n FROM 
mName1 
Type2-1, type2-2, …, type2-m FROM mName2 ; 
CafeOBJ (in  mName.mod we): 
 Declare the modules type1-1, …, type2-m 
 Every module in mName.mod will protect those 
modules  
Protecting (type1-1 + type1-2 + … + type2-m) 
 
 
 
 
 
Rule 3b: For sequences inside sequences we can now extend Rule 
3a using Rule 4. We can specify the nested sequence first and 
import the resulting module into the bigger one. 
This is everything that we can derive directly from an ASN.1 
specification. However to be able to work easily with types and 
subtypes in CafeOBJ we will need a few more work. When we 
reach the verification process we have to be able to access every 
piece of information that the original ASN.1 specification 
provides structure for. To assist us with verification purposes, we 
will add some extra operators (observational operators) in each 
CafeOBJ module: 
Rule 5a (Operator declaration): 
We create one operator with the module‟s name that gets as input 
all of the sub sorts and returns the main sort type. Also, for each 
of the sub sorts we create an operator that given the main sort as 
input, it returns the specific sort type. These operators are named 
returnXXX, where XXX is the sub sort name.  
ASN.1: 
Typename ::= SEQUENCE { 
 subtypename1 sometype), 
 subtypename2 sometype, 
...,  
 subtypenamen sometype } 
CafeOBJ: 
op typename : subtypename1 subtypename2 … 
subtypenamen -> Typename 
op returntypename1 : Typename -> subtypename1 
op returntypename2 : Typename -> subtypename2 
… 
op returntypenamen : Typename -> subtypenamen 
 
Rule 6 (Variable declaration): 
Finally to make our operator declarations work, we create 
variables, one for each sort named aXXX.  
So, the ASN.1 module defined in Rule 5a, will have these extra 
lines of code when it transforms into CafeOBJ: 
CafeOBJ: 
var atypename : Typename 
var asubtypename1 : subtypename1 
var asubtypename2 : subtypename2 
… 
var asubtypenamen : subtypenamen 
 
Rule 5b (Equation declaration): 
Finally, we can now declare the equations that complement the 
operators we described in Rule 5a using the variables we created 
in Rule 6. So, the ASN.1 module defined in Rule 5a, will have the 
following extra lines of code when it transforms into CafeOBJ: 
CafeOBJ: 
eq typename(asubtypename1, asubtypename2, …, 
asubtypenamen) = atypename . 
eq returnsubtypename1(typename(asubtypename1, 
asubtypename2, …, asubtypenamen)) = asubtypename1 . 
eq returnsubtypename2(typename(asubtypename1, 
asubtypename2, …, asubtypenamen)) = asubtypename2 . 
… 
eq returnsubtypenamen(typename(asubtypename1, 
asubtypename2, …, asubtypenamen)) = asubtypenamen .  
 
If these operators are fed with the main sort name, they can 
provide as output each of the sub sorts. For example, let's assume 
a Client declaration, with 'Client' being the main sort name, and 
'FirstName', 'LastName' and 'Address' being sub sorts of 'Client'. 
These observational operators are simply tools that can help us 
answer questions such as: 
 What is the Last Name of a given Client? 
 What is the Address of a given Client?  
A very important part of the translation is the handling of hidden 
sorts (sorts that represent the set of system states). In many 
CafeOBJ specifications the top sort tends to represent the field 
space and it‟s usually the hidden sort.   
We saw how ASN.1 keeps everything modularized and how it 
does not really matter in what order we write our modules. In each 
ASN.1 specification there is a top-level type. It‟s usually the one 
that uses everything else, directly or not. There‟s a clean way to 
declare that in ASN.1, using the “ABSTRACT-SYNTAX” 
notation to identify this top-level type. 
 
name-abstract-syntax ABSTRACT-SYNTAX ::= 
 {top-leveltypename IDENTIFIED BY … } 
 
But we can‟t be sure that ASN.1‟s top-level type will be the 
hidden sort for the CafeOBJ equivalent code since that depends 
heavily on the programmer‟s intentions. We can assume that there 
is no way for a computer program to guess what would the hidden 
sort be when it translates code, we would need to give it an extra 
input manually. So, we do feed the engine manually, with what 
we want to be the hidden sort.  
4.3. Translating ASN.1 Specifications into 
CafeOBJ 
Feeding our proposed software environment with an ASN.1 
specification, gets us a basic set of CafeOBJ modules as output, 
that will act as a base for our verification process. We will have to 
ensure the validity of the translation before we continue with the 
verification of critical system properties; ensure that the produced 
set of CafeOBJ modules is an implementation of the ASN.1 
specification. 
We assume the following property: given an ASN.1 specification, 
the generated (by our set of transformation rules) CafeOBJ set of 
modules is an implementation of the ASN.1 specification.  The 
verification of this property is vital to the success of our project. 
To do that, we will formalize the set of transformation rules 
(translator) in CafeOBJ. The „translator‟ formalized in CafeOBJ is 
called ASN.1-trans. Of course that means that we must also 
formalize ASN.1 and CafeOBJ specifications into CafeOBJ as 
depicted in the work of Senachak et al. [2005] 
4.3.1. ASN.1-trans translator 
Here we will describe the relation between ASN.1-Cafe and Cafe-
OTS as a set of transformation rules as in Barlas et al. [2010]. 
Let‟s keep in mind that while ASN.1 has way more potential to 
model every sort of exchanged messages and gives access to 
virtually any possible data type, we shall only give emphasis to 
the Boolean and numeric/key data types, assuming those are 
important for our goal; verification of protocols.  
Also, not every ASN.1 specification can be converted into a 
CafeOBJ/OTS set of modules automatically. It is vital that we 
provide some additional manual input and code rewriting to make 
it work, but still the translator that we describe will be doing most 
of the hard work. 
All of the transformation rules we described earlier will be 
modelled here in CafeOBJ code. We have a set of transformation 
rules for Sequences (or the rest of the ASN.1 types), basic data 
types (bool, int, etc) etc, modelled as operators. Given for 
example a Sequence, we have sequence2module that creates 
the CafeOBJ module named as the sequence name, defines the 
  
 
 
 
main sort and creates the main operator declaration and equation, 
and finally a variable with the name aXXX (XXX stands for 
sequencename) subseq2subsort which declares sub sorts 
under the sequence sort name, operator declarations and 
equations, and finally a variable for each such sort named 
accordingly. 
We define an operator called translate that takes an ASN.1 
specification AnASN (denoted by a sort ASN) and generates a 
CafeOBJ „program‟ ACafeOBJ (denoted by sort CAFEOBJ).  
The verification process that we will follow is similar to the one in 
the work of Senachak et al. [2005]  The condition that we want to 
verify that holds is that given an ASN.1 specification (B), the 
ASN.1-Cafe program A = translate(B) is always an 
implementation of B. To prove that A is an implementation of B 
we need to show that there exists a refinement relation [Lynch 
1996] (called R) over states of A and B provided that i) for an 
arbitrary initial state s of A, there exists an initial state u of B such 
that (s, u) є R and ii) For an arbitrary reachable state s of A and an 
arbitrary method m of A, there exists a reachable state u of B and a 
sequence of transitions (an execution of an action a) of B such that 
(s, u) є R and (m(s), a(u)) є R, where a given m is translated from 
an action a. This part is yet to be completed.  
4.4. Property Verification 
As we explained already, we now have a basic set of CafeOBJ 
modules derived from the original ASN.1 specification. But in 
order to check the validity of critical system properties, we will 
have to do a few modifications to the code, so that it resembles 
more the OTS/Proof score methodology [Ogata et al. 2006; 
Futatsugi 2006; Ogata et al. 2003].   
Since ASN.1 “has no knowledge of system state”, we have to 
somehow incorporate this into our resulting specification.  The 
state space, as declared by the hidden sort, should change any 
time an action (defined by action operators) takes place. We have 
to create operators (transitional operators) that take the current 
state space, apply the action, and then create the new state space 
as it is defined by the action modification. We also have to create 
operators that measure/report properties of the system state at any 
point (observational operators). These operators are the ones that 
can tell us what changes each time an action happens. 
When we do that, the specification is now at OTS standards, so all 
we need to do then is to insert into the specification a property 
that has got to hold in every reachable system state (a property 
that is derived from the original protocol design), and for each 
such state we write proof passages (proof scores) that force the 
system to reach that state and then check for the validity of our 
property.  
 
Figure 7. Proposed transformation scheme 
Figure 7 displays the full proposed transformation scheme; 
assuming an ASN.1 specification, we apply our transformation 
rules (as seen on 4.2) to take a set of CafeOBJ modules and by 
making the appropriate changes to the resulting code, so it has the 
OTS format (3.3 and 4.4) we are ready to use the OTS/Proof score 
methodology in order to proceed with property checking. 
4.5 Potential Applications 
Although our proposed software environment could be used with 
virtually any ASN.1 specification, we believe that it would benefit 
more protocols that need to have their peers to be able to securely 
communicate with each other. Network protocols fall under this 
category. Since ASN.1‟s primary function is to model the 
messages that are exchanged during a point to point 
communication, lots of network protocol designers write ASN.1 
specifications for their work. Getting them to work on CafeOBJ, 
makes it easy for a CafeOBJ user to further explore the security 
measures that are being taken on pre-coding stage, and spot flaws 
or verify the correctness of the protocol. For instance, knowing 
the format of the exchanged data over a Wi-Fi network secured 
with some new protocol, we can extract a CafeOBJ specification 
of the protocol and see if any eavesdropper can breach into the 
system or not. 
We think of this idea as a step towards the bridging of two 
different worlds; the world of formal methods/formal verifications 
and the current industry techniques of development and release of 
a security protocol. Any sort of such automation makes easier for 
the industry world to adopt formal methods into their research & 
development. 
5. CASE STUDY: A BANKING ACCOUNT 
STRUCTURE 
In this case study, we will consider a banking account structure 
written in ASN.1, as seen in the work of Barlas et al. [2010]. Then 
we use all of the aforementioned transformation rules to produce a 
working set of CafeOBJ modules, and finally prove some trivial 
yet critical properties. We will then modify this resulting set of 
CafeOBJ modules so that it conforms to the OTS standard, as we 
previously stated, and then find out some basic, crucial properties 
that we want our designed system to hold at any case. This is the 
proposed path that a designer should follow, so that he can extend 
an existing ASN.1 specification allowing validation of his system  
We will model the data needed for a potential client that can open 
a bank account, the actual account, and among other minor things, 
the two actions (withdraw money from the account, and deposit 
into) and a query that returns the current balance of the x account. 
5.1 ASN.1 Module 
We will model a potential Client‟s information as an ASN.1 
Sequence type, holding information such as name and address 
data, with ClientID being a unique identifier for each client. The 
ASN.1 module for the „client‟ has been given earlier (Figure 3). 
Each and every account is identified by its IBAN (International 
Bank Account System), an account owner (a bank client - 
expressed by Client) and the current balance of it. To conclude the 
specification of Account we will also have to declare the 
encapsulated data type „balance‟, as we haven‟t done that yet.  
The two actions that can happen in our bank account system are: 
depositing money into an account, and withdrawing from it. Each 
one of those transactions is bound to a specific account as 
declared by account data type, information for the client who 
performed that transaction as expressed by client data type (we 
will need that for some verification purposes), the date on which 
the transaction took place and last but not least the amount of 
money deposited or withdrawn from the account.  
All these would look like this on ASN.1: 
 
Balance ::= SEQUENCE { 
 iban  Iban, 
 amount  REAL  } 
Date ::= NumericString (SIZE (8)) -- DDMMYYYY 
Deposit ::=  SEQUENCE { 
 account Account 
 
 
 
 
 clientid ClientID, 
 date  Date, 
 amount  Real } 
Withdraw ::=  SEQUENCE { 
 account Account 
 clientid ClientID, 
 date  Date, 
 amount  Real } 
Figure 8. Balance & Deposit/Withdraw 
5.2 CafeOBJ Code 
Let‟s see this CafeOBJ code, starting from the Client module, 
which is of type „Sequence‟. 
Using the transformation rules we described earlier for Client 
structure, here‟s the resulting CafeOBJ code: 
 
mod CLIENT{ 
[Client > ClientID FirstName LastName Address 
PostCode City Country] 
op client : ClientID FirstName LastName Address 
PostCode City Country -> Client 
op returnclientid : Client -> ClientID 
op returnfirstname : Client -> FirstName 
var aclient : Client 
var aclientid : ClientID 
var afirstname : FirstName 
var alastname : LastName 
… 
eq client(aclientid, afirstname, alastname, 
aaddress, apostcode, acity, acountry) = aclient . 
eq returnclientid(client(aclientid, afirstname, 
alastname, aaddress, apostcode, acity, acountry)) 
= aclientid . 
eq returnfirstname(client(aclientid, afirstname, 
alastname, aaddress, apostcode, acity, acountry)) 
= afirstname . } 
Figure 9. Client module 
 
We‟ve skipped the rest of the operators and their equations, as 
their declarations are similar to the ones above. Let‟s proceed with 
the main module, the Account. Our hidden sort here will be 
Account so we will declare that in „*[ ]*‟ and also we will import 
the CafeOBJ included Integer module (“Int”). 
All ASN.1 data types that use the hidden sort, will be nested 
inside that module. So here besides Account we also have, 
Balance, Deposit and Withdraw, all inside the same module. This 
is what the automatic translation would give us. 
 
mod ACCOUNT { 
pr(INT + CLIENT )  
*[Account]* 
[Iban ClientID Balance] 
[Deposit > ClientID Iban Date Int] 
[Withdraw > ClientID Iban Date Int] 
op withdraw : Account ClientID Date Int -> 
Withdraw 
op returnaccount2 : Withdraw -> Account 
op returnclientid3 : Withdraw -> ClientID 
op returndate2 : Withdraw -> Date 
op returnamount2 : Withdraw -> Int 
eq withdraw(aaccount, aclientid, adate, aint) = 
awithdraw . 
eq returnaccount2(withdraw (aaccount, aclientid, 
adate, aint)) = aaccount .  
eq returnclientid3(withdraw (aaccount, aclientid, 
adate, aint)) = aclientid .  
eq returndate2(withdraw (aaccount, aclientid, 
adate, aint)) = adate . 
eq returnamount2(withdraw (aaccount, aclientid, 
adate, aint)) = aint . } 
Figure 10. Account module 
 
We now have the specification of the protocol (in this test case, a 
bank account system) in a language that we can extend trying to 
check/validate/falsify some properties of it.  
5.3 Adding Some Features 
This resulting set of CafeOBJ modules now serves as the 
backbone of our banking account system specification. We now 
need to model the changes that can happen to system states, 
bringing the specification closer to OTS requirements. Then we‟ll 
need to find some extra (security) properties that we‟ll incorporate 
into this system. Some basic things we could add: 
We want to allow someone to withdraw money from an account 
only if the requested amount is not greater than the current 
available amount of the account. Also, one can only withdraw 
money from an account, if he is the owner of the account.  
Those properties were of course not incorporated into the ASN.1 
specification, but any programmer who deals with a protocol 
knows what security properties are to be maintained at all times. 
So, we will now modify the Account module as follows: We add 
an initial state to the system, that currently an account holds no 
money. We also simplify a bit the balance operator just for the 
sake of readability. 
 
op init : -> Account 
op balance : Account -> Int 
eq balance(init) = 0 . 
eq balance(deposit(aaccount, aclientid, adate, 
aint)) = balance(aaccount) + aint . 
Figure 11. Adding initial state and balance equation 
 
The deposit action is free of any specific properties, since anyone 
can deposit any amount to any account. The act of depositing 
creates a new version of „account‟ so all we have to do is to 
observe the new value, calculating the new balance. The operator 
'balance' acts as an observational operator, where given an 
account A, balance returns the current balance. Operator 'deposit' 
(and 'withdraw') is an action operator that changes the current 
state. The same thing applies to the withdraw operator, but this 
time we also want to add a checker first, before the withdrawing 
can actually happen. 
To model these two properties in CafeOBJ, we will have to do a 
few minor changes and additions as following: 
 
ceq 
balance(withdraw(aaccount,aclientid,adate,aint)) = 
balance(aaccount) - aint 
 if (balance(aaccount) >= aint and 
returnclient(aaccount) == aclientid). 
ceq withdraw(aaccount,aclientid,adate,aint) = 
aaccount if not(balance(aaccount) >= aint) .  
Figure 12. Inserting a balance/owner check before withdrawal 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
We presented a small subset of the encoding rules that can be used 
to convert ASN.1 specifications into CafeOBJ. Also, we sketched 
some ideas towards the verification of our translation. We hope in 
the future to create and present you a fully automated piece of 
software that can do this procedure. 
Bringing closer two different cultures is what makes an automated 
translator so promising as it combines the popularity of ASN.1 
  
 
 
 
and the powerful proving engine of CafeOBJ. It is a step towards 
the adoption of algebraic specification methods by protocol 
designers who are already capable of using ASN.1. Using this, a 
protocol can be studied, verified and validated, at the pre-coding 
stage, when errors are not critical, allowing more stability when 
the protocol finally reaches the end-user. The technique can be 
applied either for existed protocols or for new ones. The full 
correctness of the translator is expected to be proved at a later 
stage.  
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